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Is It Just a Marker for Increased Care?
Richard Hockey
Because of the nature of the analysis used in this study [1], 
no conclusion is possible. There are plenty of examples in 
the literature demonstrating the “ecological fallacy”. Studies 
such as this have very little utility other than to generate 
hypotheses. I tend to think that this association is a marker 
for greater recognition and treatment for depression. 
However, it’s a brave epidemiologist who would draw any 
conclusions at all from an ecological association such as this 
where the outcome is relatively rare.  
Richard Hockey (rhockey@optusnet.com.au)
Mater Hospital
Brisbane, Australia
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Were Eli Lilly Unaware of This Study?
Aasa Reidak
The authors of this study [1] claim that no competing 
interests exist. However, Julio Licinio presented a talk at Lilly 
Research Laboratory in Indianapolis, Indiana, on March 16, 
2005, on “Depression, Antidepressants, and Suicidality: A 
Critical Appraisal” and “Suicide in the U.S. 1960-2002: Impact 
of Fluoxetine Prescriptions”, slightly over a year before the 
study was published. This is noted on page 19 of Dr. Licinio’s 
51 page curriculum vitae [2]. 
In a Medical News Today article [3], Eli Lilly claims to not have 
known about this study until it was accepted for publication. I 
don’t see how they could not have known about Dr. Licinio’s 
study, when he presented on the very topic at Eli Lilly Research 
Laboratory in Indianapolis on March 16, 2005.  
Aasa Reidak (penas7ar@rogers.com)
Lord Lansdowne Public School
Toronto, Ontario, Canada
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Authors’ Response to Hockey and Reidak
Because the increased prescriptions of antidepressants 
are correlated to increased medical visits, it is tempting 
to conclude, as Hockey did [1], that decreased suicides 
are a function of greater recognition of depression. It 
should be noted that the biggest cause of suicide is clinical 
major depression and increased visits do not treat that; 
antidepressants do. 
In a comprehensive review of the literature on the role 
of long-term antidepressant use to prevent relapse of major 
depression, Geddes et al. [2] reported that “data were pooled 
from 31 randomised trials (4410 participants). Continuing 
treatment with antidepressants reduced the odds of relapse 
by 70% (95% CI 62-78; 2p<0.00001) compared with treatment 
discontinuation. The average rate of relapse on placebo was 
41% compared with 18% on active treatment”. We therefore 
conclude that just seeing a doctor is in the long term not 
protective against major depression and its consequences, 
such as suicide. The weight of existing data supports a positive 
effect of antidepressants. It is plausible that effective long-
term treatment of depression by other methods might also be 
beneﬁ  cial.
In response to the query from Reidak regarding Eli Lilly, 
I must say that I completely disclose all my activities, and 
that is why Aasa Reidak was able to write her letter [3]. I had 
published before on this topic in Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 
and had data (which were widely known to all in the ﬁ  eld, 
including Eli Lilly) that since ﬂ  uoxetine was introduced, 
prescriptions had gone up and suicide rates had gone down. 
There is nothing really conceptually new there. That was what 
was presented at one of Eli Lilly’s regular weekly scientiﬁ  c 
sessions, which exist at most research institutions, including 
Lilly Research Laboratories. The paper published here is on 
the modelling of suicide rates using pre-1988 data to estimate 
what suicide rates would be now and therefore to predict 
a potential putative effect of ﬂ  uoxetine and other selective 
serotonin reuptake inhibitors [4] . These mathematical 
modelling data are new to this paper, and that entire analysis 
and manuscript content took place without the knowledge, 
support, or input of Eli Lilly.
The work reported in the article was done in the absence 
of any conﬂ  ict of interest or pharmaceutical industry 
support. After the paper was submitted for publication in 
PLoS Medicine, I agreed to provide consultations for Eli Lilly, 
the manufacturer of ﬂ  uoxetine. This has been a minor, 
occasional role, with very limited compensation. Such a 
relationship did not exist and was not planned when the work 
was done or the article written and submitted, and it is being 
disclosed here in the interests of transparency.  
Julio Licinio (licinio@miami.edu)
University of Miami
Miami, United States of AmericaPLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 1655
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Crossing the Language Limitations
Zhenglun Pan, Jin Gao
We read with great interest your editorial “The Impact Factor 
Game” [1]. We noticed that many of the journals indexed by 
the Science Citation Index (SCI) pay considerable attention 
to impact factors and declare their ﬁ  gures on their journals’ 
Web sites. We believe the game has become a most inﬂ  uential 
one in today’s scientiﬁ  c evaluation system. For example, some 
of China’s universities have adopted it as a core factor in the 
evaluation of the quality of research articles and recommend 
that students who are pursuing a doctorate publish at least 
one so-called “SCI-indexed paper”.
In total, 6,090 journals are indexed by SCI, most of which 
are published in English. However, there are many more 
scientiﬁ  c journals in the world. Over 6,300 local scientiﬁ  c 
journals are published here in China, but Chinese journals 
are rare in the SCI database and most of them have no impact 
factors.
Some may argue that the SCI database only includes the 
high-quality journals, but this is not necessarily the case. As a 
paper published in PLoS Medicine [2] has shown: “PubMed-
indexed Chinese studies did worse than Chinese studies not 
indexed in PubMed in deﬁ  ning disease with speciﬁ  c criteria 
(17/20 [85%] versus 137/141 [97%], respectively; exact p = 
0.042), and in ascertaining the eligibility of controls (13/20 
[65%] versus 129/141 [92%], respectively”. The quality of an 
article is not determined by its language of publication.
Language accounts for much in today’s database, especially 
when we are searching it for evidence. Language bias should 
not be neglected. A language revolution could contribute to 
scientiﬁ  c progress.  
Zhenglun Pan (panzhenglun@hotmail.com)
Department of Rheumatology, Shandong Provincial Hospital
Jinan, China 
Jin Gao
Department of Psychology, Shandong Provincial Hospital
Jinan, China 
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What Guidelines? Never Saw Them!
A. D. Gowdy
Fretheim and colleagues’ study conﬁ  rms [1] yet again how 
difﬁ  cult it is to change clinical practice. As a manager with 
a “big organization” National Health Service background, 
more recently working in practices with general practitioners 
(GPs), I always was impressed by GPs’ shameless ability to 
ignore incoming paperwork, often to the extent of trashing 
the envelope unopened, especially the big brown ones from 
the local health authority. 
I now work for a pharmaceutical company (not in my mind 
a competing interest, but I have declared it as such in the 
interests of transparency) where the ability to change practice 
is a key skill. When I compare the pharmaceutical company 
approach to that of the health authority, there are some 
key differences. It is easy to deride industry’s glossy advert 
approach, but this is simply the tip of the communications 
iceberg. In addition to the glossy adverts, there is immense 
attention by drug companies to detail. The key evidence-
based messages are tested, honed, and polished and are then 
delivered via several channels repetitively. The channels 
include face-to-face delivery by the “detailers”. Progress is 
tracked meticulously. 
This expensive but effective industry effort contrasts with 
the typical approach taken by the health authorities and other 
non-industry groups. The process of creating such guidelines 
has usually been so slow and difﬁ  cult in the gestation that 
their credibility among GPs is low even before the rather dull 
photocopied paper is issued (by post, big brown envelope) 
and meets its predictable fate.
Fretheim and colleagues say “Key components were an 
educational outreach visit with audit and feedback, and 
computerized reminders linked to the medical record 
system. Pharmacists conducted the visits”. This feels a bit like 
a policing approach (another profession watching the GP) 
allied to computer direction, none of which feel particularly 
user-friendly. A non-audit nurse (or ex-drug-rep) calling 
brieﬂ  y but frequently using the usual pens/mugs/Post-its 
reminder freebies might get a better response.
One study by Eve et al [2] did look at applying 
pharmaceutical company techniques to clinical change 
(“selling” Triple A therapy). It seemed to work. It may be 
worth bringing it back into focus.  
A. D. Gowdy (RaPP@gowdy.clara.net)
Senior Health-Sector Manager
North Down, Northern Ireland, United Kingdom
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Authors’ Response to Gowdy
We thank A. D. Gowdy for his comments [1] on our article 
[2]. He suggests that the National Health Service and 
other health-care providers have a lot to learn from the 
pharmaceutical industry. Where is the evidence? 
We are not aware of data that convincingly demonstrate the 
impact of outreach visits by pharmaceutical representatives. 
Gowdy indicates that such information exists (“Progress is 
tracked meticulously”). We would very much like to see it! 
We have had informal discussions with executives from 
companies in Norway, and we have been struck by how they 
themselves question the effectiveness of their marketing 
strategies. At a recent conference in Denmark, the medical 
director of a major pharmaceutical company gave a talk on 
the impact of industry marketing on prescribing habits [3]. 
He had no other data to show than a handful of anecdotes, 
and when questioned about this he insisted that neither he 
nor his marketing department was aware of more rigorous 
evaluations. 
The degree of interaction between the pharmaceutical 
industry and the medical profession is associated with 
differences in prescribing patterns [4]. Thus, what the 
pharmaceutical industry is doing in terms of marketing does 
seem to work, at least to some extent. However, the marketing 
effort made by industry is massive and includes a wide range 
of interventions. It is difﬁ  cult to know what the relative merit 
of each component is. 
Even more difﬁ  cult to estimate is the cost-effectiveness 
of various marketing strategies. Considering that the 
pharmaceutical industry spends a ﬁ  ve-digit amount ($US) 
per doctor per year on marketing alone [4], the industry 
should achieve substantial effects to compare favourably with, 
for instance, our results: We spent $US500 per doctor and 
achieved a doubling of thiazide prescriptions [5]. 
The only study cited by Gowdy did indeed show promising 
results. However, changes in prescribing were compared 
between practices that chose to participate in the programme 
and practices that chose not to [6], and whether this is a 
fair comparison is uncertain. Moreover, he does not put this 
study into the context of a systematic review of the relevant 
research. 
Gowdy thinks our intervention sounds like “a policing 
approach”. This does not ﬁ  t with our perception. The 
doctors were satisﬁ  ed with the chance of meeting an industry-
independent source of information and appreciated the 
opportunity to reﬂ  ect on their own practice in light of the 
information and feedback that we provided them. 
Gowdy’s use of the term “evidence-based” when describing 
the messages conveyed by pharmaceutical companies begs a 
brief comment. Several investigators have assessed the quality 
of advertisements and promotional material distributed by 
the pharmaceutical industry. They consistently conclude with 
a word of caution against basing clinical practice on claims 
made by pharmaceutical companies [7–10].  
Atle Fretheim (atle.fretheim@nokc.no)
Andrew D. Oxman
Norwegian Knowledge Centre for Health Services
Oslo, Norway
References
1.  Gowdy AD (2006) What guidelines? Never saw them! PLoS Med 3: e413. 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030413
2.  Fretheim A, Oxman AD, Håvelsrud K, Treweek S, Kristoffersen DT, et al. 
(2006) Rational Prescribing in Primary Care (RaPP): A cluster randomized 
trial of a tailored intervention. PLoS Med 3: e134. DOI: 10.1371/journal.
pmed.0030134
3.   Waldorf S (2006) [Marketing by the pharmaceutical industry: What is the 
effect on doctors’ prescribing? Does it serve corporate or societal interests?] 
[Presentation in Danish] University of Odense; 2006 15 May; Odense, 
Denmark. Available: http:⁄⁄www.almen.dk/almen2/pdf/laegemiddel/
waldorf.pdf. Accessed 10 August 2006.
4.  Wazana A (2000) Physicians and the pharmaceutical industry: Is a gift ever 
just a gift? JAMA 283: 373–380.
5.  Fretheim A, Aaserud M, Oxman AD (2006) Rational Prescribing in 
Primary Care (RaPP): Economic evaluation of an intervention to 
improve professional practice. PLoS Med 3: e216. DOI: 10.1371/journal.
pmed.0030216
6.  Eve R, Golton I, Hodgkin P, Munro J, Musson G (1997) Summary of key 
lessons from the Framework for Appropriate Care Throughout Shefﬁ  eld 
(FACTS) project. Centre for Innovation in Primary Care. Available: 
http:⁄⁄www.innovate.org.uk/library/changeclinical/clinprac.htm. Accessed 
10 August 2006. 
7.  Cardarelli R, Licciardone JC, Taylor LG (2006) A cross-sectional evidence-
based review of pharmaceutical promotional marketing brochures and their 
underlying studies: Is what they tell us important and true? BMC Fam Pract 
7: 13.
8.  Loke TW, Koh FC, Ward JE (2002) Pharmaceutical advertisement claims in 
Australian medical publications. Med J Aust 177: 291–293.
9.  Villanueva P, Peiro S, Librero J, Pereiro (2003) Accuracy of pharmaceutical 
advertisements in medical journals. Lancet 361: 27–32.
10. Solhaug HR, Indermo H, Slordal L, Spigset O (2006) [Written drug 
advertisements—Are they reliable?] [Article in Norwegian] Tidsskr Nor 
Laegeforen 126: 1314–1317.
Citation: Fretheim A, Oxman AD (2006) Authors’ response to Gowdy. PLoS Med 
3(9): e414. DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030414
Copyright: © 2006 Fretheim and Oxman. This is an open-access article distributed 
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits 
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the 
original author and source are credited.
Funding: The authors received no speciﬁ  c funding for this article. 
Competing Interests: The authors are employed by the Norwegian government.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030414
Are Nonhuman Primates Good Models 
for SARS?
Robert J. Hogan
I would like to respond to Haagmans and Osterhaus’ 
Perspective [1] on Lawler et al.’s study [2]. I have been 
actively studying SARS virus both in vitro and in numerous 
animal models including mice, cotton rats, ferrets, and 
macaques since April, 2003 (about six weeks after the 
virus was ﬁ  rst identiﬁ  ed). While I do concur with some of 
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the statements made by Haagmans and Osterhaus, I am 
compelled to provide an alternative view. I completely agree 
with the stance that an animal model which mimics the 
severe disease observed in human cases is needed. However, 
the continued use of nonhuman primates in these studies 
is simply not warranted. Indeed, multiple groups have tried 
unsuccessfully to reproduce this model, including Lawler and 
colleagues [2] . For example, I attended the WHO meeting 
on SARS in Rotterdam in February, 2004, at which Steven 
Jones, of the National Microbiology Laboratory, Winnipeg, 
Canada, said:  “If I were one of those monkeys, maybe I’d just 
take a Tylenol” [3]. 
With my colleagues, I conducted a study in which both 
rhesus and cynomolgus macaques were infected with SARS-
CoV. I did not see any clinical signs of disease or marked 
lung pathology [4].  A study by Subbarao and colleagues 
had similar ﬁ  ndings: “SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV) 
administered intranasally and intratracheally to rhesus, 
cynomolgus and African Green monkeys (AGM) replicated in 
the respiratory tract but did not induce illness” [5].
Perhaps the most interesting issue is that Lawler and 
colleagues clearly state that “SARS-CoV infection of 
cynomolgus macaques did not reproduce the severe illness 
seen in the majority of adult human cases of SARS” [2].  To 
my knowledge, only  Osterhaus’s laboratory and laboratories 
from China have reported severe disease in SARS-CoV 
infected macaques. Osterhaus mentions that the variability 
in results may be due to factors such as the strain of virus 
used, and this is certainly true. However, he has not released 
the virus isolate used in these studies to me or my colleagues 
in spite of requests. Given that so many groups (e.g., the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the United States 
Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, the 
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, etc.) 
with excellent scientiﬁ  c skills and credentials have reported 
contradictory results with at least two strains of SARS-CoV, it 
is troublesome that the use of nonhuman primates in SARS 
pathogenesis, vaccine, and therapeutic testing continues.  
Robert J. Hogan (jhogan@uga.edu)
University of Georgia
Athens, Georgia, United States of America
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Authors’ Response to Hogan
In response to our Perspective on nonhuman primate models 
for SARS [1], which accompanied the article by Lawler et al. 
[2], Robert Hogan questions the usefulness of nonhuman 
primates as good models for SARS [3]. 
As demonstrated by several groups, SARS coronavirus 
(SARS-CoV) replicates to high titers in the respiratory tract of 
a surprisingly broad range of animal species, albeit showing 
remarkable differences in cell tropism. We have argued that 
efﬁ  cient infection of type 1 and 2 pneumocytes as seen in 
macaques and humans—most likely due to the similarities 
in the spike protein binding domains of the host SARS-
CoV receptor ACE2—is a prerequisite for the SARS-CoV 
infection–induced pathology observed in humans. So far 
there is no strong evidence that a similar tropism is observed 
in other animal species.
However, the tropism of SARS-CoV for pneumocytes may 
not sufﬁ  ce to induce severe clinical signs in primates. In case 
of a resolving infection in macaques, pathological changes 
are evident four to six days after infection and may have 
become inapparent by days 12–14. In addition, in young adult 
humans, SARS-CoV infection generally causes relatively mild 
disease. Viral sequence differences in the SARS-CoV isolate 
HKU 39849 obtained from and distributed to several groups 
by Peiris et al. [4], as compared to other strains used, may 
determine the outcome of SARS-CoV infection in macaques. 
Furthermore, recent experiments from our group indicate 
that clinical signs after infection with this virus are more 
likely to occur in aged macaques (unpublished data). Clinical 
signs observed in our earlier experiments were largely 
characterised by lethargy, whereas respiratory distress was 
observed in one animal [5,6].
The apparent differences observed in clinical outcome of 
the infection in macaques, which is similar to the outcome 
in humans, may limit the utility of SARS-CoV–infected 
macaques as a model for severe SARS. However, none of the 
other models available produces clinical disease related to 
respiratory distress, except for ferrets that are inoculated with 
the HKU 39849 virus intratracheally [7]. Therefore, we feel 
that the macaque model may indeed provide important clues 
to the pathogenesis of SARS. As also argued by Subbarao and 
Roberts [8], there is no single preferred model for SARS and 
combining the data obtained in different animal models may 
help to solve the question of why SARS is so devastating in 
some humans. This also holds true for the development of 
effective vaccines and other intervention strategies against 
possible future SARS-CoV outbreaks which may be caused by 
genetically quite distinct viruses.  
Bart L. Haagmans
Albert D. M. E. Osterhaus (a.osterhaus@erasmusmc.nl)
Department of Virology, Erasmus Medical Center
Rotterdam, The Netherlands
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Snakebite: Sociocultural 
Anthropological Bias
Arunachalam Kumar
While congratulating the authors of this informative article 
[1] for throwing light on a serious, yet much neglected health 
hazard, snakebite envenomation, we would like to add one 
more vital and cryptic cause for the abnormally high statistics 
in developing Asian countries: religion.
Both Nepal, cited in the paper as having the highest 
number of casualties, and India are predominantly populated 
by Hindus (in fact the only two countries in the world with 
Hindu majorities). In Hinduism, the cobra is, from time 
immemorial, revered as a vital element among the Hindu 
pantheon of holies. Cobra worship for countering infertility, 
ill fortune, or for tempering the wrath of divine curses, is not 
only widespread, but also ﬁ  rmly believed and perpetuated. 
India is dotted with thousands of shrines and roadside 
temples dedicated to the “nag-deva” (cobra deity).
Cobras are rarely, if ever killed when discovered in 
unwelcome locales; the trespassing serpents are usually 
trapped and released out of harm’s way [2]. The universal 
dread of incurring holy herpetological hexes not only allows 
the poisonous snake a second life, but also allows it to add its 
might to the ever increasing gene pool and population.
It is futile in this scenario to talk about education and 
awareness campaigns; thousands of years of religious 
indoctrination cannot be negated by education or literacy. 
The best, and perhaps only way, global intervention and 
funding can contribute to minimizing snakebite casualties is 
through ensuring anti-venom availability in large quantities 
over wide geo-locales in sub-continental Asia.  
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